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Editorial Introduction to Louis Althusser’s ‘Letter to 
the Central Committee of the PCF, 18 March 1966’
William S. Lewis
Department of Philosophy and Religion, Skidmore College 
wlewis@skidmore.edu
Abstract
As an accompaniment to the translation into English of Louis Althusser’s ‘Letter to the Central 
Committee of the PCF, March 18th, 1966’, this note provides the historical and theoretical 
context necessary to understand Althusser’s ‘anti-humanist’ interventions into French Communist 
Party policy decisions during the mid-1960s. Because nowhere else in Althusser’s published 
writings do we see as clearly the political stakes involved in his philosophical project, nor the way 
in which this project evolved from a ‘theoreticist’ pursuit into a more practical one, the note also 
argues that the letter is of importance to Althusser scholars, to historians of Marxist thought, and 
to those interested in the relevance of Althusser’s work to contemporary Marxist philosophy.
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On 13 March 1966, after three days of deliberation, the Central Committee 
of the French Communist Party (PCF) unanimously adopted a ‘Resolution on 
Ideological and Cultural Problems’.1 Ostensibly taking as its subject the 
relations between the PCF, intellectuals, and culture, this resolution was 
viewed by many as the moment when the PCF offi  cially abandoned its Stalinist 
legacy and sought to better integrate itself into French and Western-European 
political life.2 To those more interested in French Marxist philosophy than 
French Marxist politics, this document is also remembered as the text that 
delivered the Party’s statement on the ‘Humanist Controversy’. In this mode, 
it served not only as a resolution on the relationship among the PCF, intellectuals, 
and culture, but also as a resolution of the debates among Party intellectuals 
1. Parti Communiste Français 1966, pp. 265–80.
2. Vigreux 2000, p. 214.
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competing to have their revisions to Marxist-Leninist theory adopted as the 
PCF’s offi  cial philosophy. 
As prominent intellectuals and PCF Central Committee members, Louis 
Aragon and Roger Garaudy both participated in preliminary talks about the 
merits of humanist versus anti-humanist philosophies and in the three days of 
discussion, writing, and revision that immediately preceded the resolution’s 
adoption. Records of these debates clearly indicate that these two intellectuals 
had their say, that they were heard, and that their voices informed the fi nal 
document. However, because he was not, like Aragon and Garaudy, a Central 
Committee member, one of the controversy’s principal protagonists was never 
heard from directly, and this despite the fact that he had originated the anti-
humanist position. Th is intellectual was Louis Althusser.
Th ough shut out from participating in the series of debates that preceded 
the resolution (except by proxy and this only during preliminary discussions), 
Louis Althusser followed each exchange quite closely. He did so because he 
believed that literally everything was at stake with the resolution. Th is feeling 
about the resolution’s importance was not limited to Althusser, or even to the 
intellectuals in competition with him for theoretical hegemony in the Party, 
but was widely shared among Central Committee members.3 Party members 
who were thoughtful and cared about the future of the PCF recognised this 
resolution as the culmination of the long period of introspection occasioned 
by Khrushchev’s 1956 ‘Secret Speech’ at the Twentieth Congress of the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). Long in coming, the 
resolution was intended to defi ne the Party’s post-Stalinist direction.4 At 
stake, then, were not only the dynamics among intellectuals, the Party, and 
culture, but also the Party’s self-understanding. Th is was true in terms of its 
philosophy and with regard to its place in the domestic and international 
political landscape.
With no direct access to the Central Committee as it met for three days in 
the Parisian suburb of Argenteuil to draft the resolution, Althusser was placed 
in a reactive position. When the document appeared in Party daily L’Humanité 
on 15 March and Althusser discovered that, in the main, it did not include his 
anti-humanist position, he had basically two options. Given his position at the 
École Normale Supérieure (ENS), the fi rst was to respond as an academic 
philosopher, authoring articles and books elucidating his anti-humanist 
Marxism and, thereby, indirectly demonstrating that the Party that claimed to 
be the instantiation of Marxist philosophy misunderstood this very philosophy. 
3. Sève 2000, p. 66.
4. Sève 2000, p. 67.
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Indeed, there is evidence that Althusser took this approach, seeking in work 
intended for publication to better support his arguments such that, eventually, 
everyone – including the Central Committee – would be won over to his 
understanding of Marxism. Most of this work went unpublished during 
Althusser’s lifetime.5
Given his status as public intellectual and party member, the second option 
open to Althusser was to respond to the Central Committee directly. No 
doubt, this alternative might have had a more immediate eff ect than the other 
option, and it was pursued by Althusser – albeit in an even more abortive 
fashion than his attempts at academic refutation. Having carefully read the 
resolution as well as seemingly every published intervention [position paper] 
delivered by committee members during the Argenteuil discussions,6 Althusser 
took great pains to draft a letter to the Central Committee registering his 
objections to the resolution. In this letter, he sought to reveal its primary 
contradiction and to make plain its numerous theoretical errors. In addition, 
he attempted to indicate how the theoretical mistakes made in the resolution 
would lead the Party to tactical errors. Unlike the work intended for academic 
audiences, which did, in part, see the light of day, and had some eff ect on 
academic Marxist theory, this letter was probably never sent and it never found 
its audience.7
Whether the excuse for not sending his missive was depression, cowardice, 
or Althusser’s habitual invocation of ‘the conjuncture’, this dispatch was and 
remains a document of some importance to Althusser scholars, to historians of 
Marxist thought, and to those interested in the relevance of Althusser’s work 
to Marxist philosophy today. In this letter, and in the course of ‘correcting’ the 
Party’s incorrect theses on the proper reading of Marx, Althusser states quite 
clearly his position on the way in which Marx must be read if one wishes to 
5. Th e bulk of Althusser’s work in this regard has been translated and published posthumously 
as ‘Th e Humanist Controversy’ in Althusser 2003, pp. 221–307. A small part of this text was 
excerpted by Althusser for the essay titled ‘Sur le rapport de Marx à Hegel’ that appeared in 
Althusser 1972. Th is was the only part of Althusser’s eff orts to clarify his anti-humanist position 
to see publication during his lifetime. 
6. Th ese published interventions and Althusser’s marginal notes on them are preserved in his 
archive, see: ALT2.A43-04.04, Fonds Althusser, Institut Mémoire de l’Édition Contemporaine, 
Paris, France.
7. In writing this note, ten primary and eight secondary accounts of the humanist controversy 
were reviewed. Th ree of these secondary accounts consulted PCF archives. Not one mentions the 
Central Committee as having received this letter. All, however, remark on the centrality of 
Althusser’s position in the debates and it is relatively certain that, had such a letter been sent, it 
would have been discussed. In his correspondence from the time and in his recollections of the 
controversy afterwards, Althusser mentions writing the letter but does not mention having sent 
it or having received a response. 
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avoid a return to Stalinism or a politically hazardous detour into humanist 
Marxism. Of course, this hermeneutic strategy is developed elsewhere by 
Althusser and in a more sophisticated way. However, nowhere in his published 
writings do we see as clearly the political stakes involved in Althusser’s 
philosophical project, nor can we see the way in which this project evolved 
from a ‘theoreticist’ project into a more practical one. As G.M. Goshgarian 
notes in his introduction to Th e Humanist Controversy, Althusser’s dealings 
with the Party between 1966–7 were crucial to the development of his 
thought.8 Written in 1966, when Althusser was perhaps most involved with 
trying to re-direct the Party, this document represents a crucial link between 
the Althusser of Reading ‘Capital’ and the Althusser of Lenin and Philosophy. 
Inasmuch as, with this text, we see an example of philosophy working to 
criticise and challenge ideological notions about the world and thereby to 
inform political practice, it can also be seen to perform that function which 
Althusser will claim, in the writings recently compiled as Philosophy of the 
Encounter, to be the proper role of materialist philosophy.9 To the extent that 
it does this, it allows us to see how such engaged theory might function today. 
As it was written in response to a specifi c resolution, at a specifi c moment, 
and from a specifi c place, one cannot read this letter as pure political philosophy. 
Yes, Althusser does opine in it about the nature of the political world, about 
the ‘essence’ of man, and about the diff erence between truth and ideology. 
However, he also writes about how Marxist principles and concepts demand a 
specifi c course of action, at a particular historical moment, and in a particular 
place. While these concerns certainly make the letter of more than philosophical 
interest, they also make it harder to engage with its ideas. Especially as the 
moment that Althusser sought to intervene into is, today, rather remote, before 
we identify the specifi c theoretical positions that inform the resolution it is 
probably best to review what was at stake in its adoption. Having accomplished 
this, it should then be possible to consider Althusser’s reaction to the resolution 
and to demonstrate how this reaction is informed by the arguments he advanced 
in his work from the early 1960s. Finally, this note will show how this reaction 
represents an instance of philosophy informing political practice, a move that 
Althusser will later champion as the role for philosophy but that is undertaken 
here without a conscious understanding of its proper function.
If the debates at Argenteuil and the resolution that resulted from them were 
about how the PCF would de-Stalinise, then the Central Committee had 
much to consider in this regard. Not only did it have to articulate a new party 
8. Goshgarian 2003, pp. xi–xii. 
9. Althusser 2006, pp. 231, 287.
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philosophy – one which could replace Stalinist ‘diamat’ – but it also had to 
think about how any new positions it took would inform and infl uence its 
political affi  liations. Domestically, this meant worrying about its connection 
not only to the broader French Left but also to that group of which it had 
always considered itself to be the representative, the working class. Further 
complicating these considerations was the problem of its rapport with an 
increasingly important group with which it had historically enjoyed a troubled 
relationship, intellectuals. Th is group had recently been expanded by the PCF 
to include not only scientists, academics, artists, and students but also 
professionals such as teachers, architects, and engineers.10 Given that these 
sub-groups often identifi ed (or failed to identify) with the PCF for quite 
diff erent reasons, the range of domestic relationships that the PCF had to 
reconsider was dizzying. No less complex were its international affi  liations. 
Th ough still following Moscow’s lead and desirous of maintaining a close 
relationship with the CPSU, Russia’s policy reversals, its squabbles with China, 
its treatment of artists and intellectuals, and its unpopular military and 
diplomatic actions made it diffi  cult for the French Party to align itself with the 
Soviet Union in the way it had done for nearly half a century. 
Along with domestic and international relations, also under review at 
Argenteuil was the Party’s automatic seconding of Stalin’s interpretation of 
Marxist-Leninist philosophy. After 1956, it was no longer an easy task to defend 
a theory of history which insisted that the Soviet Union was the historical agent 
preordained to lead the world to communism. Nor was it easy to accept this 
theory’s corollary, that every national Communist party must unquestionably 
support the CPSU’s actions. Also diffi  cult to swallow was the epistemology 
promulgated by Stalin and Zhdanov and justifi ed by the aforementioned 
philosophy of history, which insisted on the ideological character of all 
proletarian thought and on the infallibility of proletarian knowledge.11 When 
the Soviet Union’s claims to be the ultimate exemplar of an enlightened, 
egalitarian, free, and prosperous nation were belied by Khrushchev’s speech 
and by the Soviet invasion of Hungary, each of these theories – as well as the 
distinctions and principles that undergirded them – became suspect.
If Stalinism had become increasingly unpalatable even to long-serving 
members of the French Communist Party, then one can only guess at its lack 
of appeal to new members and to potential sympathisers. Reform was needed. 
Th ough carried by Stalinist inertia for four years, the PCF did begin in the 
early 1960s to consider and debate substantive changes. Still very much tied 
10. Santamaria 1999, pp. 74–5; Courtois and Lazar 1995, pp. 323–4. 
11. Lewis 2005, pp. 118–27. 
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to the Soviets, this refl ection was encouraged in 1961 by the Twenty-Second 
Congress of the CPSU, where the Party announced the end of the dictatorship 
of the proletariat and suggested that there were many possible routes to 
socialism. Th is reconsideration was also accelerated in the middle of the decade 
by the death of the long-serving French Communist Party General Secretary 
Maurice Th orez and by Waldeck Rochet’s assumption of the position in 1964.
In addition to both internal and external pressures to reform and to the 
domestic, international, and philosophical concerns detailed above, the PCF 
had a bevy of other issues to address with the Argenteuil resolution. Following 
some hesitant moves towards affi  liation that it had begun in 1961,12 by mid-
decade, the PCF leadership had judged that, in a union with the broader Left, 
it had a chance of obtaining a parliamentary majority and of instituting 
reforms. Further tilting the Party away from international issues, and therefore 
away from Moscow, was a change in its economic analysis. No longer did the 
PCF hew to a global theory of imperialism. Instead, it was moving to endorse 
the theory of ‘state monopoly capitalism’.13 Because this theory focused on the 
relationship between French industry and the French state as the nexus of 
wealth concentration and as the cause of class division, the importance of 
domestic issues in PCF politics was naturally foregrounded. 
Th ough new political possibilities and new economic theses drove the 
resolution’s drafters to consider the PCF’s domestic situation in a new light, it 
was a queer kind of international relation – one mostly engaged in by dissident 
Party members – that drove the Central Committee to refl ect on matters 
philosophical. Because PCF members and potential sympathisers were well 
aware of, and often sympathetic to, the possibilities for party constitution and 
theoretical reform evidenced by the Chinese and Italian Parties, the PCF’s 
long tradition of shadowing every Soviet thought and gesture was thrown into 
unfl attering relief. In an era when the Italian Communist Party had successfully 
instituted democratic reforms and when China had embraced a policy of total 
cultural reform and renewal, the French Party’s long-standing practice of 
democratic centralism and of taking direction exclusively from Moscow 
appeared as anachronistic as its insistence that French workers were becoming 
increasingly impoverished.14 
Despite frequent statements concerning the ‘revisionism’ of the Italians and 
against the ‘dogmatism’ of the Chinese, the Party was well aware that these 
positions had attracted many of its most dynamic and visible members. Even 
12. Adereth 1984, pp. 175–7.
13. Courtois and Lazar 1995, p. 323. 
14. Courtois and Lazar 1995, p. 325.
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if they did not have a clear grasp of the theories supporting the accomplishments 
of Togliatti and Mao, students at France’s grandes écoles evinced a particular 
fascination with these alternative formulations of Marxism-Leninism. As 
factions were forming within the PCF between those members who stuck to 
the party line and those (mostly students and intellectuals) who looked to 
Italian and Chinese models for theoretical inspiration, the French Communist 
Party refl ected dissensions within the international Communist movement.15
By mid-decade, foreign infl uences were not the only causes of a philosophical 
crisis within the PCF. Th e discrediting of Stalinist diamat as well as the opening of 
party theoretical journals and presses to multiple perspectives at the beginning 
of the 1960s allowed a limited plurality of alternatives to Stalin’s interpretation 
of Marxist-Leninist philosophy to be aired and debated. Sometimes, these 
revisions lined up with foreign theories, sometimes they did not. For instance, 
Garaudy’s humanism was occasionally labelled ‘Italian’ while Althusser’s anti-
humanism was often decried as ‘Chinese’ or ‘Maoist’. Even when they did not 
follow foreign patterns, these alternatives were identifi ed by the Party leadership 
as either ‘dogmatist’ or ‘revisionist’ and criticised for their separation of theory 
from practice.16 Despite the PCF’s initial reaction to these new interpretations 
of Marxism, it was apparent by the early 1960s that the Party needed openly 
to repudiate diamat and to endorse an alternative if it wanted to attract and 
retain those members who thought philosophy to be important for the 
Communist movement. For the most part, these were intellectuals.
Recognising this need for philosophical reform, the party press Éditions 
Sociales released a new summary of Marxist philosophy in 1962.17 Th is offi  cial 
statement, however, did not quell debate. Soon after its release, the party 
leadership found itself faced with the need to make a choice between the 
various ‘dogmatist’ and ‘revisionist’ philosophies being aired by prominent 
intellectuals associated with the Party. After a period that included incredibly 
well-attended public debates as well as more intimate discussions between 
party philosophers, progressive theologians, and non-party left intellectuals,18 
the Party settled on Garaudy’s socialist humanism as its offi  cial philosophy 
and on Garaudy as its party philosopher.19 Militating against this settlement 
of opinion, though, were two tensions within the Party. One was caused by 
students and intellectuals desirous of revisions that were more radical and 
15. Bowd 1999, pp. 53–4. 
16. Bowd 1999, pp. 48, 58–9.
17. Rochet 1962.
18. Besse 2000, p. 33. 
19. Bowd 1999, p. 52.
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more philosophically substantive than Garaudy was prepared to off er.20 Another 
challenge to the offi  cial approbation of Garaudy’s humanism was the party 
leadership’s own workerist bias. Th is bias tended to reinforce the view that, 
despite being founded and led by intellectuals in the early twentieth century, 
the Party did not need these fi gures now because the Party was itself a type of 
‘collective intellectual that brings socialism to the working class and to the 
people’.21 Being its own organic intellectual, the Party did not need bourgeois 
professors or poets to tell it what to think or what to do. 
When, in May 1964, Waldeck Rochet formally resurrected the idea of a 
Union of the Left at the PCF’s Seventeenth Congress, the unsettled state of 
the Party’s philosophy became a practical problem. As the Socialists and other 
left parties had been burned many times before by a PCF whose allegiance to 
the Soviet Union and to international Communism came before any domestic 
union, they needed abundant reassurance that the Communists had changed. 
Garaudy’s ethic of dialogue and his philosophy of socialist humanism probably 
went a long way towards mending theoretical and political fences. Nevertheless, 
there was still the Party’s workerist bias to contend with, as well as the pressure 
on the Party by intellectuals for more radical and substantive revisions (as well 
as for ones more in keeping with its traditions). Th e force of these tensions was 
certainly felt at the series of discussions on culture and class that followed the 
Seventeenth Congress.22 Also, and perhaps more prominently, the tension 
among intellectuals was evidenced in the Party’s leading theoretical journal, La 
Nouvelle Critique, where thinkers espousing the humanist position debated 
those defending anti-humanism.23 Further disturbing the Party’s attempt to 
present a unifi ed, predictable, and benign face to the broader Left was the 
publication in autumn 1965 of Louis Althusser’s books For Marx and Reading 
‘Capital’. Th ough published by a ‘dissident’ press, these books were written by 
a somewhat prominent party member and they seemed to attack many of the 
ideals and principles held dear by socialists and other humanists. 
Sensing the need for the PCF to resolve these issues if it wanted to move 
forward with a politics of unity, Waldeck Rochet organised a meeting of party 
philosophers to discuss the Party’s (theoretical) identity problem. Held at 
Choisy-le-Roi in January 1966, these discussions had the goal of ‘testing, 
through the exchange of many perspectives, theoretical questions currently 
being debated by communist philosophers and the setting out of the conditions 
20. Sève 2000, pp. 63–4.
21. Maurice Th orez as quoted in Juquin 2000, p. 80. My translation.
22. Juquin 2000, pp. 81–2.
23. See La Nouvelle Critique 164 (May 1965); as well as Matonti 2005, pp. 71–5; Bowd 
1999, p. 61; Juquin 2000, pp. 81–5. 
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for the collective work in which each comrade can bring his particular 
contribution’.24 Remembered by participants as extremely tense,25 discussion 
focused on the relative merits of Garaudy’s argument in De l’anathème au 
dialogue (1965) as against Althusser’s arguments in For Marx and Reading 
‘Capital’. 26 As one of the meeting’s most vocal participants, Garaudy viciously 
attacked Althusser’s reading of Marx. Sick with a nervous malady, Althusser 
did not attend the meeting. However, his position was defended by Michel 
Verret who also took the time to read from a text that Althusser had previously 
circulated among his students.27 Hearing from ally and meeting participant 
Pierre Macherey that the garaudistes were apparently on the defensive and that 
they had attacked his position with ‘violence, bad faith, and idiocies’, Althusser 
was hopeful after Choisy-le-Roi that his anti-humanist philosophy would win 
the day.28 Th erefore, in the weeks leading up to the conference at Argenteuil, 
he was optimistic about what the document eventually issued as ‘Resolution 
on Ideological and Cultural Problems’ would contain. 
As at Choisy, discussions at Argenteuil were disputatious and full of emotion. 
Charged with composing a resolution that would take up no more than one page 
in L’Humanité and that was readable by everyone, a committee of fi ve meeting 
under the direction of Louis Aragon fi rst listened to the interventions of various 
Central Committee members and then went to work.29 As these interventions 
have been preserved, it is possible to match-up the substance of each with the 
contents of the fi nal document and to determine whose thoughts manifest 
themselves in the fi nal document and to what extent.30 It is apparent from even a 
cursory glance that the positions of Louis Aragon and Roger Garaudy comprise 
the document’s theoretical core and take up much of its length. Th is preliminary 
judgement as to the extent and importance of Aragon’s and Garaudy’s contributions 
is confi rmed by fi rst-hand accounts of the meetings.31
24. Suret-Canale 2000, p. 125. My translation.
25. Lucien Sève as quoted by François Matheron in Matheron 2000, p. 171.
26. Matheron 2000, p. 170; Geerlandt 1978, p. 30.
27. Th is text appeared in English as ‘Th eory, Th eoretical Practice and Th eoretical Formation: 
Ideology and Ideological Struggle’ in Althusser 1990, pp. 1–43.
28. Matheron 2000, p. 172.
29. Besse 2000, pp. 40–2.
30. Edited offi  cial transcripts of these interventions appeared in Cahiers du communisme, 5–6 
(May–June 1966): 9–263. Unexpurgated tape recordings of these interventions are retained in 
the PCF archives and, in at least one case, the trouble has been taken to compare the original to 
its offi  cial version. For this comparison, see Léo Figuères, ‘Aragon et la resolution du Comité 
central d’Argenteuil’, and Aragon 2000, pp. 135–52.
31. One of the chief sources for this note, Les Annales de la Société des amis de Louis Aragon et 
Elsa Triolet, 2, includes a half-dozen such accounts.
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In charge of the document’s drafting as well as a member of the Central 
Committee and the Political Bureau, Louis Aragon was perhaps in the best 
position to infl uence the resolution. Th at he was widely celebrated in France 
for his literary work and was a confi dant of both Maurice Th orez and Waldeck 
Rochet could only have amplifi ed his voice at Argenteuil.32 As resolutely 
anti-Stalinist as anyone else on the Central Committee and as committed to 
the Party, Aragon desired a resolution expressive of a theory that supported a 
strong, united organisation but which would avoid the dogmatism, rigidity, 
and exclusivity that Stalin’s theory demanded.33 Because he believed that 
culture is advanced by scientists and artists, he also wanted to see the document 
state that intellectuals are as essential to the revolution as the proletariat. Given 
the importance he attributed to ‘intellectual workers’, he was also particularly 
concerned about their status in the Party and their freedom to pursue research. 
Despite this concern, Aragon also maintained that the need for political 
expediency trumped every other demand, including that of freedom of research.34 
Each of these ideas shows up in the completed resolution, some implicitly, others 
explicitly. However, insofar as each of these opinions reveal themselves in the 
resolution’s repeated references to man as creator, none is quite so explicit as 
Aragon’s idea of the link between cultural achievement and revolution.
Having a rather low opinion of philosophical speculation, Aragon’s ‘philosophy’ 
was derived more from sentiment than from rational argument.35 Th is view of 
philosophy as well as his beliefs about the role of the Party and the status of 
culture would obviously pitch Aragon against someone like Althusser, who 
thought that philosophy or ‘theory’ was the most important thing for the 
Party and who doubted that ‘culture’ could do anything more than reproduce 
itself.36 Th erefore, it is not surprising that Aragon attacked Althusser’s 
philosophy both during his intervention at Argenteuil and in a letter sent to 
Waldeck Rochet two months before the meeting.37 Th e attacks bear more than 
a passing resemblance to the charges Meletus levelled at Socrates. Repeating 
the accusations of ‘corrupting the youth’ and of ‘impiety’, Aragon chastised 
Althusser for his encouragement of ‘Maoist’ students at the ENS and for 
insisting on the importance of philosophical ideals over against the demands 
of political facts38 – not crimes against the city but against the Party. Aragon 
32. Juquin 2000, p. 87.
33. Juquin, 2000, pp. 87–9. 
34. Louis Aragon in a letter to Waldeck Rochet quoted by Juquin 2000, p. 100, (see also 
pp. 87, 98).
35. Bowd 1999, p. 64.
36. Aragon 2000, pp. 135–6.
37. Aragon 2000, pp. 131–4. 
38. Juquin 2000, pp. 100–2.
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believed that Althusser’s philosophy weakened the PCF politically and he 
argued that Althusser’s emphasis on the importance of theory would result in 
the Party’s domination by a ‘technocratic-theoretical’ élite.39 He alleged as well 
that the PCF’s politics – especially its politics of unity – would suff er from this 
domination.
While Aragon was perhaps at the peak of his infl uence in 1966, Garaudy’s 
was on the wane. Were it not for Althusser’s challenge to his socialist humanism, 
a Party that had grown less and less enthusiastic about his philosophical 
concessions to the Socialists and to the Christian Left might have already 
marginalised Garaudy.40 Althusser’s theoretical intervention, however, provided 
Garaudy with a new platform for his humanism. Th is renewed prominence 
permitted him to play a substantial role in the discussions at Argenteuil and 
Choisy. While never enamoured with his humanist philosophy, Aragon sought 
an alliance with Garaudy during the debates in order to create a block that would 
resist not only Althusser’s anti-humanist theory but also any retrenchment by 
the Party in Stalinist orthodoxy. Given the Party’s inertia, this retrenchment 
looked all too easy for it to carry out.41 By teaming up with Garaudy and other 
‘humanists’, Aragon was able to argue more eff ectively for his vision of ‘socialism 
with a human face’ and to push de-Stalinisation to its limits.42
Because Garaudy’s humanist philosophy fi tted well with Aragon’s estimation 
of the vast creative powers of the human spirit, this alliance proved to be a 
strong one. Th ough Garaudy was by 1966 no longer the ‘party philosopher’, 
he still sat on the Central Committee and was director of the Centre d’Études 
et de Recherches Marxistes. While the former position gave him access to PCF 
leadership, the latter gave him oversight of the Party’s theoretical journals. As 
fervent an anti-Stalinist as he was once a Stalinist,43 Garaudy had for years 
been arguing for increased philosophical pluralism within the Party and for 
opening up the PCF theoretically and politically to outside infl uences. In 
contrast to Aragon’s positions, these ideas were philosophically supported. 
Having wholeheartedly embraced Marx’s early work as his true philosophy, 
Garaudy developed a humanist Marxism that made use of notions he found in 
works like the Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s ‘Philosophy of Right’ (1843) 
and Th e Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 such as ‘species being’, 
‘alienation’, ‘disalienation’, and ‘whole man’.44 With these notions, Garaudy 
39. Bowd 1999, pp. 59, 61.
40. Sève 2000, p. 64.
41. Sève 2000, pp. 69, 70.
42. Juquin 2000, pp. 88, 91.
43. For an example of Garaudy’s Stalinist phase see Garaudy 1948, p. 31. For an example of 
the about-face turn to anti-Stalinism, see Garaudy 1960.
44. See G.M. Goshgarian’s endnote to Althusser 2003, p. 219, n. 10.
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constructed a philosophical anthropology in which man is described as being 
in the process of overcoming his alienation through acts of self-creation. To 
this philosophy of history, Garaudy added an epistemology which he intended 
to function as an alternative to Stalin’s theory of knowledge. Th us, rather than 
maintaining with Stalin and Zhdanov that only the proletariat held true 
knowledge about the world, Garaudy argued that all classes and all peoples 
potentially possess knowledge that may be useful to humanity in its struggle 
to overcome alienation. In addition, he specifi ed that the way to access this 
knowledge and to make use of it practically was through dialogue and collective 
action.45 Th ough Garaudy’s philosophy does not come across in the document 
as explicitly as do Aragon’s positions, it is quite visible in the resolution’s 
endorsement of humanism, in its frequent mention of the ‘whole man’, and in 
its calls for the pursuit of socialist goals by diverse paths.
In contrast to his own humanism as well as to the Stalinist tradition of 
economism, Garaudy viewed Althusser’s Marxism as an ‘aberration’.46 Like 
Aragon, he believed that Althusser put far too much emphasis on the importance 
of theory. Garaudy was especially outraged by Althusser’s hierarchisation of 
practices, a ranking that put philosophy on top as the ‘theory of theoretical 
practices’ and which subsumed politics beneath it. As for the gambit that 
followed from this hierarchisation, namely, to have theorists lead the Party,47 
Garaudy saw it as a deliberate attempt on Althusser’s part to reject the ‘criterion 
of practice’ and publicly chastised him for this mistake, reminding the wayward 
professor that ‘the fundamental responsibility for every Communist is neither 
theoretical nor scientifi c, it his responsibility with regard to the Party’.48
Given Althusser’s absence during the resolution’s drafting and considering 
Garaudy’s and Aragon’s dominance of the meeting at Argenteuil, it is a bit of 
a surprise that Althusser’s positions make any appearance at all in the completed 
document. Th e wide dissemination of his arguments, his status with young 
intellectuals, his wider prestige, and the fact that – in at least one respect – his 
goals for party reform were not incompatible with Aragon’s were enough, 
however, to ensure that Althusser enjoyed some support on the Committee 
and that some of his ideas were present in the document.49 Th is infl uence is 
evident where the resolution seconds Althusser’s understanding of historical 
and dialectical materialism with its statement that Marxism is founded on a 
45. Grellard 2000, pp. 190–4.
46. Matheron 2000, p. 171.
47. Goshgarian 2003, pp. xi–xii.
48. Roger Garaudy as quoted in Matheron 2000, p. 171. My translation.
49. See especially the intervention of Michel Simon 1966, pp.109–35. Simon’s comments on 
why he was not even more supportive of Althusser’s position appear in Matonti 2005, p. 105.
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‘rigorously scientifi c conception of the world’. It is also evident in its declaration 
that ‘incumbent on Marxist-Leninist parties is the responsibility for theory’.50 
With Althusser being as hostile to Zhdanovism as Aragon, his understanding 
of historical materialism also comes through in the resolution’s calls for 
freedom of scientifi c research. Indeed, it is on this position where the sentiments 
of the maître à penser and the grand écrivain are most in accord (though for 
diff erent reasons).
As with every other Althusserian position that found its way into the 
document, surrounding statements weaken the full impact of this call for 
freedom of research. For example, the resolution’s unwillingness to distinguish 
scientifi c from artistic pursuits blunts Althusser’s call for a social-scientifi c 
research agenda that might come to direct party action. Likewise, whereas 
Althusser would have insisted that those most capable of discharging the 
Party’s ‘responsibility for theory’ are professional theorists, the fi nal document 
distorts this position (and evidences the Party’s workerist bias) with the 
specifi cation that theory is the responsibility ‘of intellectuals just as much as it 
is of workers and peasants’.51 Finally, in the most glaring instance of the erosion 
of Althusser’s platform, the resolution precedes its declaration that Marxism is 
an objective science by an affi  rmation that Marxism is a type of humanism.
For Althusser the anti-humanist, Marxism’s scientifi c status means that it 
cannot make use of pre-scientifi c, ideological, or mystical notions like ‘human 
being’, ‘human essence’, and ‘humanity’s goal’. It is the repeated modifi cation 
of his philosophical positions, such as the combination of scientifi c concepts 
with ideological ones, that appears to have really set Althusser off  when he fi rst 
read the resolution. As it contains in germ most of the arguments that he 
made in the fi nished letter to the Central Committee presented here, a note 
that he wrote to the Cercle Politzer (his Marxist study group at the ENS) 
probably best represents Althusser’s fi rst reaction to the resolution. Th e analysis 
is very harsh in tone and pulls no punches in its criticism of the Central 
Committee for its ‘theoretical compromise’, for its endorsement of ‘spiritualism’, 
and for its failure to admonish Garaudy suffi  ciently’,52 Th ough much lengthier 
and not nearly so devoid of politesse as the note to the Cercle Politzer, the fi rst 
draft of Althusser’s letter to the Central Committee diff ers little in content and 
tone. However, now added to the memo’s criticisms of Garaudy and its charge 
of theoretical compromise are personal pleas for consideration, extended 
exegeses of the resolution’s main points, and references to canonical Marxist 
50. Parti Communiste Français 1966, pp. 273, 277–8.
51. Parti Communiste Français 1966, p. 278.
52. Althusser 1966.
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texts. Also added is a healthy dose of sarcasm. Th ough, after three additional 
drafts, it is much refi ned and augmented, this initial draft’s agreements, 
exegeses, and earnestness also characterise the completed letter. Largely missing 
from this fi fth and fi nal draft, however, are the personal pleas and the sarcastic 
tone that mark the initial attempt. From a comparison of all the drafts, the 
seriousness with which Althusser took his response is everywhere manifest. 
From draft to draft, each emendation and change is designed to make his 
arguments more clear and – by means of politesse – more palatable to members 
of the Central Committee.53
Like an instructor in the Party school’s (and, maybe, like a scholastic 
philosopher citing Holy Scripture), Althusser refers throughout the letter to 
the founders of Marxism-Leninism as authority. In this mode, he repeatedly 
appeals to accepted Marxist-Leninist laws and principles, recalling the Central 
Committee to them and pointing out the contradictions with the laws that 
the resolution contains. Th e bulk of his arguments start from the premise that 
Marx, Engels, and Lenin have given the Communist Party revelations about 
the nature of the world that need be preserved in their purity if the Party is to 
achieve its goals. Appealing as it does to the Party’s traditions as well as to its 
well-inculcated self-understanding, this is probably a wise rhetorical strategy 
(and one that Althusser had great diffi  culty weaning himself away from). In 
itself, however, it would never be suffi  cient to argue for and encourage the 
departure from Stalinism that is ostensibly Althusser’s goal. Th is is especially 
the case as so much of this understanding of Marx, Engels, and Lenin seems 
indebted to Stalin’s Foundations of Leninism.54 So, like a good scholastic 
philosopher (but not like most party philosophy instructors), Althusser 
constructs out of these authoritative sources an original interpretation of Marx 
that resists Stalinist tendencies and reveals the Garaudian and Aragonian 
understandings of Marxism that dominate the resolution to be theoretically 
and politically misguided.
53. Apparently added as well is a false dateline, 18 March. Th e letter may have been pre-dated 
by Althusser so as to indicate to the Central Committee the seriousness with which he took the 
resolution or it may simply indicate the day that he started to compose the letter. Given both the 
number and extent of revisions as well as the existence of a note by Althusser to Franca Madonia 
from 21 March indicating that the letter was still in preparation (Althusser 1998, p. 664), it is 
probable that Althusser took at least a week to revise and amend the various drafts. For more on 
the letter’s drafting see Matheron 2000, p. 176.
54. As Gregory Elliott makes clear in the chapter ‘Questions of Stalinism’ from Althusser: Th e 
Detour of Th eory, Althusser’s relationship to Stalin’s theory and to Stalinism is complex and often 
contradictory. As late as 1969, and long after he had fi rst publicly criticised Stalinism, Althusser 
still sometimes referred favourably to Stalin’s theory. See Elliott 1987, pp. 268–70.
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Of course, persuasively arguing that true Marxism is and always has been 
anti-humanist and that anti-humanism is not a Stalinist position is possible 
only if one ignores the many humanist elements present in Marx’s and Engels’s 
texts as well as in the PCF’s history.55 Aware of these traditions and perhaps 
anticipating this counter-argument, Althusser does not content himself with 
selectively citing Marx, Engels, and Lenin. Rather, he uses the arguments that 
he developed in For Marx and Reading ‘Capital’ in order to demonstrate that 
the resolution makes numerous theoretical errors. Th e most obvious example 
of this mobilisation of philosophy is Althusser’s juxtaposition of the resolution’s 
affi  rmation of the necessity of free research with the declaration that ‘there is a 
Marxist humanism’.56 As he points out to the Committee almost ad nauseam, 
this declaration prematurely resolves the controversy about whether ‘the 
human’ is a scientifi c or ideological concept. Subtler than the highlighting of 
this error are the ways in which Althusser deploys his theory of Marxist 
concepts in order to unmask the ideological notions endorsed by the resolution. 
Also less obvious, but no less a part of the letter’s argument is its use of the 
schema that Althusser developed in Reading ‘Capital’, which specifi ed that 
philosophy is its own practice and that it must not be contaminated with 
ideology. Every reader of Althusser will also notice where the theory of the 
‘break’ between the young Marx and the mature Marx serves to advance his 
contention that dialectical materialism is in no way a spiritualism and that 
historical materialism is a science.
Th e combined force of these contentions is intended to suggest to the 
Central Committee an alternative to Stalinism that – unlike the resolution’s 
alternative – is not revisionist. In lieu of embracing humanist values and 
celebrating ‘creators’, Althusser argues in the letter that the correct path can 
only be found by giving theory its due, by being scientifi c, and by paying 
attention to the words, actions, and even the silences of Marx. Th erefore, in 
addition to insisting that the words Marxists use correspond to their theory 
and that the Party should maintain a specialised scientifi c vocabulary, he 
reminds the Central Committee of the importance that Lenin always gave to 
theory and the rights that Marx and Engels had already accorded it at the 
Gotha Unity Congress. As yet another antidote to revisionism, Althusser 
55. Th e PCF’s humanist impulses were particularly evident immediately following World 
War II and during the Front National. Th ey were also present at the party’s founding in the early 
1920s by idealists such as Romain Rolland and Boris Souvarine. Th ough one does not have to 
make as strong a claim for Marx’s humanism as does John Roche in his recent article ‘Marx and 
Humanism’ (Roche 2005, pp. 335–48), few would dispute the claim that there are humanistic 
elements present throughout Marx’s and Engels’s œuvre. 
56. Parti Communiste Français 1966, pp. 273, 280.
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warns that the resolution’s over-valuing of art and culture will fatally 
compromise its ability to understand the world and direct the revolution. Th at 
is because this embrace of art and culture stems from and leads to a vast 
overestimation of the role that ‘creators’ play in the revolutionary process.
In each draft of the letter to the Central Committee, Althusser states his 
belief that a compromise has been struck with Garaudy and Aragon and he 
warns that this theoretical concession will compromise the Party’s attempts at 
reformation. In this initial judgment of the resolution, Althusser was in 
agreement with many other concerned observers. Subsequently, most 
commentators on the resolution have affi  rmed this opinion and have added 
the retrospective judgment that, though the resolution may have allowed the 
Party to retain more intellectuals, its overall eff ect was to limit reforms, to 
reinforce the leadership’s clout, and to limit the infl uence of scientifi c research 
on party policy.57
While Althusser probably never mailed his letter of objection to the resolution, 
he did get a chance during the summer of 1966 to make its arguments to the 
person then most capable of registering it, Waldeck Rochet.58 Th e fact that 
this audience occurred demonstrates that Althusser did have a voice in the 
Party. However, if the meaning of words lies in their eff ects, then one can say 
that the Central Committee never ‘got’ the letter and that Rochet was not 
persuaded by his conversation with Althusser.59 Certainly, neither communication 
convinced the PCF to prioritise theory and respect scientifi c research.
Despite never having its intended eff ect on the French Communist Party, 
the writing of this letter and the formulation of its arguments did aff ect 
Althusser. While perhaps not conscious of how it would do so when he wrote 
the letter, the missive strives to off er a critique that may ‘assist in the 
transformation of the world’.60 Th ough, in March 1966, Althusser believed 
philosophy’s role to be much greater,61 he would later identify this function as 
philosophy’s actual role. Eventually, through the process of formulating 
57. For critics who view the resolution as a compromise and for more on the extent of its 
eff ects see: Bowd 1999, pp. 63, 66n, 67; Geerlandt 1978, p. 132; Juquin 2000, pp. 108–13; 
Matonti 2005, pp. 107–9; Matheron 2000, p. 169; Olivera and Pudal 2000, p. 264; Sève 2000, 
p. 71; Vargas 2000, pp. 246–7; Vigreux 2000, pp. 214–15.
58. In his droll account of the interview with Rochet, Althusser almost cites verbatim the 
letter’s argument. See Althusser 2000, pp. 182–3. 
59. An indication of Rochet’s attitude towards Althusser is to be found in his summary 
discourse at Argenteuil where the General Secretary indirectly reproaches Althusser for ‘separating 
Marxist theory from Marxist practice’ and for doing theoretical work that is ‘too abstract’ (Rochet 
as quoted in Vigreux 2000, p. 213).
60. Althusser 1971, p. 68.
61. Althusser 1993, p. 171.
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materialist arguments about the nature of the world and observing these 
arguments’ eff ects, Althusser came to revise his original estimation of philosophy’s 
worth. He also began to assign to it the role just mentioned.62 Read as an 
instance of this type of criticism and not in the way Althusser originally 
intended it to be read (that is, as Marx’s true philosophy unmasking its would 
be revisionists), the letter clearly appears as a philosophical argument designed 
to push the Party away from Stalinism on the one hand and humanism on the 
other. As this and subsequent attempts by Althusser to encourage party reforms 
largely failed or remained uncompleted,63 it cannot be said that he learned of 
this function for philosophy solely from the Party’s positive reaction to his 
arguments. However, the Party’s lack of response to his eff orts at theoretical 
reform certainly taught him not to overestimate philosophy’s power.
Th at this lesson stuck with him is not only evidenced by Althusser’s 
argument from the late 1970s and mid-1980s that philosophy works ‘by way 
of ideologies on real, concrete practices’ in order to change these practices;64 it 
is also demonstrated in the account of his philosophical development from his 
autobiography L’Avenir dure longtemps. Here, Althusser reiterates his argument 
against the resolution and recalls his failure to get Rochet to admit the importance 
for communist practice of theory and of clear scientifi c concepts.65 In this new 
telling of the events around the resolution, he also notes that any possible 
infl uence that this 1966 interview may have had was not due to the fact that 
he had presented strong philosophical arguments that the Party was unable to 
refute. Instead, the possibility of infl uencing the Party existed because the 
arguments he made in the early 1960s in theoretical journals had persuaded a 
number of students and other intellectuals that anti-humanism was a viable 
theoretical option for the Party.66 In 1966, the Central Committee and Rochet 
had to respond to Althusser, but not because of his arguments’ rigour and 
strength. Rather, they had to listen to him and partly to incorporate his views 
because his arguments had created a faction that the Party wished to retain.
Th is retrospective realisation by Althusser’s of the actual role that philosophy 
plays in the world does not vitiate the philosophical importance of the 
arguments contained in this letter to the Central Committee. Th ough this is 
not the only place these arguments were made67 and though he later abandoned 
62. Matheron 2000, p. 179; Goshgarian 2003.
63. Goshgarian 2003, p. xi.
64. Althusser 1994, p. 170; Althusser 2006, p. 280.
65. Althusser 1993, pp. 197–8.
66. Althusser 1993, p. 198.
67. See Althusser 2003, especially ‘Th e Philosophical Conjuncture and Marxist Th eoretical 
Research’, pp. 1–19.
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some of its claims (most notably those on the status of philosophy), he also 
developed ideas from the letter on scientifi city and on the role that ideology 
plays in culture into constitutive parts of his philosophy. In addition to its 
philosophical value, the manner in which the letter demonstrates that 
Althusser’s work between 1960 and 1965 was no mere scholastic exercise 
makes it into an important document of intellectual history. Contrary to 
the caricature of Althusser’s work of the early to mid-1960s – which portrays 
it as the hermetic exercises of an academic philosopher intent on developing 
a Marxism incorporating fashinable psychoanalytic, anthropological, and 
hermeneutic theories – this letter reveals the way in which the arguments 
Althusser made during this period were intended to have a political eff ect. 
Indeed, it demonstrates this even if Althusser himself was not then fully 
conscious of how philosophy produces such eff ects. 
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